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• The financial and economic crisis has taught central banks
a lesson. They were previously primarily concerned with
maintaining price stability, but the crisis has produced
evidence to show that monetary policy can contribute to the
development (or the mitigation) of systemic risk in the
financial sector. Monetary policy therefore needs to take
financial stability implications into account, and the
macroeconomic implications of bank supervision and
regulation must also be considered.
• It is therefore important to understand the linkages between
financial risk, monetary policy and the business cycle. This
paper considers the thinking to date on risk taking in
monetary policy, presents comparative evidence for the
euro area and the United States, and interprets the evidence
using a macro dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model.
• This approach produces three preliminary conclusions:
central banks' monetary policy approaches affect, with time
lags, the propensity of financial markets and banks to
assume risk; it is possible to take account of these effects
through macroeconomic models that embody optimising
agents with limited information and include explicitly
banking and financial sectors; and there is some indication
that the modelling done in the paper can be used as the
basis for predicting the relationship between monetary
policy and the effect of risk on macroeconomic variables,
though this area needs considerable further research.
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Abstract
We assess, through VAR evidence, the eﬀects of monetary policy on banks’ risk
exposure and find the presence of a risk-taking channel. A model combining frag-
ile banks prone to risk mis-incentives and credit constrained firms, whose collateral
fluctuations generate a balance sheet channel, is used to rationalize the evidence. A
monetary expansion increases bank leverage. With two consequences: on the one side
this exacerbates risk exposure; on the other, the risk spiral depresses output, therefore
dampening the conventional amplification eﬀect of the financial accelerator.
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1 Introduction
Central banking no longer is what it used to be. Until 2007, central banks followed an
established paradigm, composed of three fundamental elements. The first — call it single
focus — stipulated that monetary policy should aim solely at maintaining price stability,
defined as a low and stable rate of price change for a basket of consumer goods and services.
The specific time horizon for achieving this target was debated, but most believed it should
be rather short, around 18 to 24 months — inflation forecasts are notoriously unreliable at
long horizons. The second tenet was that central banks should be independent, i.e. not
influenced in their decisions by governments, businesses, trade unions, or other. The last
element was a sort of assignment principle: neither should central banks pursuing price
stability be distracted by concerns for other policy domains, nor should other policy actors
share responsibility for price stability. For two reasons: first because shared objectives
create uncertainly on where responsibility really belongs; second, because potential failures
in attaining other goals may dent the credibility of central banks in achieving their primary
objective, price stability. This latter argument was used most forcefully to suggest that
central banks should not be responsible for banking and financial supervision1. In the years
of the "great moderation" the three legs of this paradigmatic tripod seemed so stable and
solid that monetary policy was often referred to as a science.
The financial crisis raised questions on many of these earlier certainties. The transmis-
sion of monetary policy seems more complex than was assumed earlier. Its eﬀects may extend
much beyond inflation and aggregate demand at short-medium horizons, to encompass the
risk-taking propensity of economic agents, with second-round eﬀects at longer and unknown
lags. Naturally, the existence of a "risk-taking channel" of monetary policy — specifically, a
link between monetary condition and the propensity of agents to assume financial risk — puts
the single focus tenet into question (see Eichengreen et al. [26]). But also the assignment
argument would somehow be aﬀected; if monetary policy can contribute to the formation
1See the classic survey of Goodhart and Schoenmaker [30].
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(or the mitigation) of systemic risks in the financial sector, and if the latter in turn feed
back on macroeconomic performance with unknown lags, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that monetary policy needs to keep financial stability implications into account, and that
the macroeconomic implications of bank supervision and regulation need to be considered as
well. Completing the triangle, though nobody has seriously questioned the merits of central
banks independence, some voices from the political quarters — the US Congress, for example
— reveal a temptation to attach to the assignment of new responsibilities to central banks in
the area of financial stability a tighter scrutiny over their decisions2.
In this complex picture, a key priority is to understand the linkages between monetary
policy, financial risk and the business cycle. Our plan is the following. First, we briefly
review some recent literature on the risk taking channel of monetary policy. Second, we
present some new time series evidence. The evidence in the literature and that presented
in this paper support the idea that monetary policy influences risk-taking in the banking
sector via changes in its funding side. An expansionary monetary policy induces banks to
choose a more leveraged and risky capital structure. Third, we lay out a macro model with
banks to interpret this evidence. The model is standard except for the fact that it includes
a banking sector, which, on the funding side, is exposed to endogenous bank runs (see
Diamond and Rajan [24], [25], Allen and Gale [5], and more recently Angeloni and Faia [9]),
while on the lending side it faces an asymmetric information problems with firms requiring
external finance to undertake investment (Bernanke et al. [12]). More specifically, on the
funding side, banks act as relationship lenders on behalf of outside financiers and raise funds
through short term liabilities, which are subject to a service constraint, and capital. Within
the contractual agreement stipulated between the bank and the outside investors, runs on
short term liabilities arise endogenously as discipline device: despite this, a fall in the risk
free rate (as triggered by expansionary monetary policy) induces banks to increase short term
liabilities (which become cheaper), and the probability of a run on such liabilities occurring.
2Kashyap and Mishkin [33].
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On the asset side, loans are granted to entrepreneurs to launch investment projects, financed
partly with internal funds, partly by the intermediary and partly by corporate loans, whose
return is subject to idiosyncratic shocks observable only by entrepreneurs. The bank can
observe the shock ex post upon payment of a monitoring cost. The ensuing agency problem
is solved through a costly state verification contract a’ la Gale and Hellwig [29], as in the
financial accelerator model.
The presence of the two contractual agreements allows us to consider both the entre-
preneurs’ balance sheet channel and a banks’ risk taking channel. A fall in the policy rate,
by increasing asset prices, brings about an increase in the value of both intermediaries’ and
entrepreneurs’ balance sheet. The latter induces a decline in the premium firms pay on
external finance, which generates an amplification of the transmission to aggregate demand
and output. This is the standard financial acceleration mechanism. In addition, the fall in
policy rate induces intermediaries to increase short term liabilities, hence their risk exposure
(a risk taking channel)3. Bank risk generates resource costs, in terms of foregone output for
early project liquidation and an expected loss on deposits: for this reason, in the medium
run, output is generally lower than in a standard financial accelerator. This rich specification
allows to examine the impact of monetary policy on both the lending and the funding be-
havior of banks, and to analyse how the interaction of the two sides aﬀects the transmission
to the real side of the economy.
The model is analyzed in comparison with two simpler benchmarks: the model by
Angeloni and Faia ([9], henceforth AF), with banks but no financial accelerator, and the
classic financial accelerator, without banks. We find that the model combining the two
sources of risk contains a number of novel features concerning monetary transmission. Risks
on the asset side and on the liability side of banks tend to move together and to reinforce
each other: a fall in the policy rate induces more firms to require bank funding; the increased
3Importantly, notice that the traditional financial accelerator advances the opposite prediction for what
concerns firms’ risk: as the policy rate falls, the external finance premium declines; firms become more
solvent and their default rates decline. In this respect, the eﬀect of the monetary expansion is univocal. Our
model shows that this can come along with banks which, by leveraging more, face higher run probability.
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platform of investment projects, requiring funds, coupled with the cheaper cost of short term
liabilities induces banks to increase leverage, therefore increasing the overall likelihood of a
run. Since bank risk generates resource costs, the risk spiral depresses output, dampening
the monetary policy transmission to the real economy. in our parameter configuration, the
dampening eﬀect reduces the potency of the transmission mechanism compared to both
the conventional financial accelerator model and a model like AF, featuring only the bank
funding risk.
So far, the literature has oﬀered some examples of partial equilibrium static models
featuring banks’ risk taking: from the classic work of Allen and Gale [7], to, more recently,
Acharya and Naqvi [2], Agur and Demertzis [3], Dell’Ariccia, Laeven and Marquez [34],
De Nicolo’ et al. [23]. Three features make our work diﬀerent and particularly suitable to
interpret macro evidence. First, the earlier papers focus on partial equilibrium banking and
neglect the transmission of risk to the real economy4. Second, in those papers the interest
rate is exogenous: accounting for the endogenous response of the monetary authority seems
a natural step to interpret macro time series evidence. Third, not less importantly, the
literature has focused on risk taking on the asset side of the bank balance sheet, while we
explore also the interaction with the funding side.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we recall some recent literature relevant
to our problem. In section 3 we present new time-series evidence on the transmission of
monetary policy on bank risk in the US. In section 4 we present our macro model. In section
5 we analyse the model, in two-steps: first we provide an intuition for the mechanics and
interaction of the liability and the asset sides of the bank; second we look at two impulse
responses, respectively to a monetary policy and a productivity shock. In doing so, we
compare the properties of our model with those of the two simpler benchmarks described
above. Finally, section 6 concludes.
4Allen and Gale’s [7] model features a link with consumption.
5
2 Recent empirical evidence
The surge of interest for the implications of monetary policy on financial risks after the
recent crisis contrasts sharply with the virtual absence of any reference to risk in the earlier
literature on monetary policy transmission. The classic 1995 survey by Mishkin, Taylor
and others in the Journal of Economic Perspectives [36] hardly mentions bank and financial
risks at all. In the multi-country empirical study of monetary transmission in the euro area
conducted by the Eurosystem central banks, dated 2003 (see Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon
[10]), indicators of bank risk are actually used in the econometric estimates of the “lending
channel”, but only to quantify certain features of the banking sector that, taken as a given,
may aﬀect the strength of the transmission, not because monetary policy may itself influence
those characteristics.
In a diﬀerent context, however, other authors had stressed the potential importance of
the link between monetary policy and financial risks well before the onset of the financial
crisis. Already in 2000, Allen and Gale [6] had provided a theoretical underpinning for these
ideas by showing how leveraged positions in asset markets create moral hazard: leveraged
investors can back-stop losses by defaulting, and this makes asset prices deviate from funda-
mentals. The link with monetary policy, clarified in later work by Allen and Gale [7], consists
in the fact that aggregate credit developments in the economy are, at least partly, under the
control of monetary authorities. Borio and Lowe [19], described how asset market bubbles,
leading to financial risk and instability, can develop in a benign macroeconomic environment,
including high growth, low inflation, low interest rates and accommodative monetary policy.
Their seminal contribution was followed by a host of publications by economists at the Bank
for International Settlements calling for the adoption of a "macroprudential approach" to
financial stability including, notably, a response of monetary policy to asset prices.
In 2005, Rajan [38] analyzed how the incentives structures in the financial system may
induce asset allocation managers to assume more risk under persistently low interest rates.
In a low interest rate environment, portfolio managers that are compensated on the basis
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of nominal returns have an incentive to search for higher yields by taking on more risk.
Risk built up during periods of monetary accommodation turns into instability when policy
is tightened, leading to confidence crises and possible "sudden stops" of credit. Two are
the implications for central banks: first, monetary policy should avoid prolonged periods of
excessively low interest rates. Second, when high risk is already entrenched in the financial
sector, abrupt policy tightening can be highly contractionary or even destabilizing.
To help the subsequent analysis, it is useful to distinguish between two diﬀerent channels
through which risk-taking behavior can operate. The first is via changes in the degree of
riskiness of the intermediary’s asset side. In presence of low and persistent interest rates
levels, asset managers of banks and other investment pools may have an incentive to shift
the composition of their investments towards a riskier mix, either for the reasons explained
by Rajan [38], or because the overall risk in the economy increases. A second channel
runs via the structure of bank funding. An expansionary monetary policy may aﬀect the
composition of bank liabilities, altering the mix of capital and short term funding in favor
of the latter. This channel operates in particular when short term rates are low and the
yield curve upward sloping, as emphasised for example by Adrian and Shin [1]. Statistical
and anecdotal information confirm that financial institutions on both sides of the Atlantic
(banks, conduits and SIVs, investment funds, insurance companies, etc.) became riskier, in
the pre-crisis years, due not only to more leveraged balance sheet structures, but also to
more risky assets.
The empirical evidence on these transmission channels has grown fast in recent times.
Two strands can be distinguished. A first one tried to identify eﬀective leading indicators
of financial crises. It has been found that, in a variety of diﬀerent national contexts and
historical periods, financial crises tend to be preceded by a recurrent set or economic devel-
opments (see Reinhardt and Rogoﬀ, [40]). In particular, using time series comprising data
for 18 OECD countries between 1970 and 2007, Alessi and Detken [4] find that monetary
and credit aggregates are leading indicators of costly asset price boom/bust cycles. A similar
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conclusion is reached by Goodhart and Hoﬀmann [29], focusing on house price booms. This
evidence, though not conclusive in establishing a causal link between monetary policy and
risk-taking behavior, nonetheless suggest that variables that are close to the control span of
monetary policy, such as monetary and credit aggregates, should be watched carefully since
they are systematically associated with the insurgence of financial instability.
Two very recent papers tackle the issue more directly.
Maddaloni and Peydró Alcalde [35] use answers from a survey of lending behavior among
banks of the euro area to see whether monetary policy influences the lending practices of
banks. In particular, the questionnaires try to distinguish between supply related factors
(i.e. linked to bank-specific conditions) and demand related ones (i.e. depending upon
borrowers’ conditions). The authors use a panel regression to link the survey results to
alternative indicators of monetary policy. The proxy for monetary policy has consistently
significant eﬀects: a monetary expansion leads to lower credit standards, for corporate as
well as personal loans. Moreover, the longer a given policy stance lasts, the more eﬀect its
seems to have.
Another recent paper (Altunbas et al. [8]) uses a more comprehensive sample and a
diﬀerent measure of bank risk. They consider over 600 listed European banks, in 16 countries,
for which Moody’s KMV has computed expected default frequencies (EDF hereafter). EDFs,
expressing market perceptions of the default probability at a given time horizon, are a widely
used measure of bank risk, shown to have predictive power in many cases. EDFs are obtained
translating, with a model, several market and balance sheet indicators into a single measure,
a time-varying probability of default at a specific time horizon. The authors make this the
dependent variable in a panel regression, that includes a variety of explanatory factors —
macroeconomic variables, market data, other bank characteristics — as well as monetary
policy. The results suggest that a decrease of short term rates reduces overall bank risk in
the short run but increases it over time. The immediate eﬀect is attributed to the impact
on outstanding loans; the delayed one to the fact that banks tend to engage subsequently in
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more risky lending (note, however, that this eﬀect could also be due to more risky funding).
A similar conclusion is reached by Jimenez et al. [32] in their analysis of a large sample of
Spanish banks, using detailed credit register data.
3 Some time series evidence
In this section we report some time series evidence on the eﬀect of monetary policy on
bank risks, following the ideas illustrated in the previous section. The main purpose, besides
adding new aggregate time series evidence to that already existing, which is mainly on micro-
panel data, is to try to shed some light on the diﬀerent channels through which monetary
policy aﬀects bank risk: funding behavior, lending behavior, or both, or neither.
We use a standard orthogonalized VAR model, with monthly US data over the period
from January 1980 to September 2011. We adopt, with modifications, the specification used
by Bloom [16] (see also Bloom et al. [17]). The VARs include a small set of variables
characterizing the macro-economy, such as output and labor market performance (industrial
production index, employment), inflation (CPI and PPI), and a measure of monetary policy
(detrended Fed funds rate). To this basic specification we add a small set of proxies for
bank risk5. In particular, we used three measures (more details on these and on the macro
variables are in the Data Appendix):
A] a measure of bank funding risk, represented by the volume of bank "market
funding" (bank funding net of capital and customer deposits) as a ratio to total bank assets.
This is intended to measure that part of bank funding that is subject to roll-over risk, namely,
uninsured funds carrying a non-contingent contractual return and hence potentially subject
to sudden withdrawal if market confidence deteriorates.
B] a measure of bank asset risk, derived from the FED Survey of Terms of Business
Lending; in particular, the variable used is the balance of answers to the question of wether
5The ordering is that adopted by Bloom, with the additional assumption that all shocks immediately
influence the bank balance sheet. As it is not clear which of our bank risk variables should be placed first,
we estimated diﬀerent VAR models inverting the order of these two variables; the results are not aﬀected.
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the bank conditions for commercial and industrial loans to large and medium enterprises
had been tightened6.
C] a measure of bank overall risk, represented by a realized volatility measure of
daily returns on bank stocks7.
The three measure are meant to identify possible channel of transmission of monetary
policy to bank risk, the first to the liability side of banks, the second to the asset side,
the third to banks as a whole (hence encompassing possible eﬀects running through either
the liability side, or the asset side, or both). In particular, we expect that, if there exist a
"risk taking channel" of monetary policy running via the funding side, the proxies A and
C should decline significantly when monetary policy is tightened. If instead a risk taking
behavior exists only on the lending side, proxy B and C should show a significant decline. If
no risk taking channel to banks exist, none should be significant.
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of bank funding risk and of bank overall risk, re-
spectively in the upper and lower panels, to an upward monetary policy shock (the measure
of asset risk was never significant, and is not reported8). The eﬀects are both significant,
negative and protracted (the confidence band are calculated at 90 percent level). In partic-
ular, the proxy for bank funding risk (upper panel) reacts significantly on impact, builds up
reaching a peak at around 2 quarters (remember that data are monthly) and then gradually
phases out. The proxy for overall risk (lower panel) does nor react immediately, but shortly
afterwards becomes significantly negative and reaches a peak at about the same lag. It is
remarkable that, though the proxies are completely diﬀerent in their statistical content, the
profile is similar (though funding reacts first) and the peak is located at about the same
time.
We conducted a checks to verify the robustness of our results. We first changed the de-
6This variable is available only at quarterly frequency, hence we estimated a quarterly version of the
model.
7Specifically, we used the average of daily absolute returns of a bank stock price index over each month.
8Results for other variables are available on request.
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finition and the measurement of our risk variables, replacing them with alternative proxies9;
the results remained stable. Finally, we ran all estimates again on quarterly data; the results
were stable, but significance was somewhat lower. Finally, in addition to the VARs we also
calculated Granger causality tests. The results, not reported here, are consistent in spirit
with the VAR results just described: we found evidence of causality from monetary policy
shocks to the proxy for funding risk, while causality in the other direction was not detected.
4 A macroeconomic model with banks
The real sector of the model consists in a conventional DSGE model with nominal rigidities.
On the financial side our framework is richer, featuring banks with an endogenous funding
choice and endogenous risk of bank run. The lending side of the bank follows a standard
financial accelerator model. This structure allows to consider the role played in monetary
transmission by the two distinct sources of risk, respectively on the funding side and on the
lending side of the bank.
4.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households who consume, save, and make portfolio de-
cisions. In every period, a fraction  of the household members are workers/depositors, a
fraction  are entrepreneurs who invest in capital and a fraction 1−  −  are bank capi-
talists. As worker, the household can work either in the production sector or as employee in
the banking sector. Bank capitalists remain engaged in their business activity next period
with a probability  independent of history, while entrepreneurs remain in business with a
probability  This finite survival scheme is needed to avoid that bank capitalists and en-
trepreneurs accumulate enough wealth to remove the limited liability constraint. A fraction
(1 − ) of bank capitalists and a fraction (1 − ) of entrepreneurs exit every period. To
9Concerning funding risk, the ratio of market funding to total assets was replaced by the ratio of inter-
bank funding to total assets. As a measure of overall bank risk we alternatively used the expected default
frequencies produced by Moody’s KMV.
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maintain the population share of bank capitalists and entrepreneurs constant over time, we
assume that in every period a fraction (1−) of workers become bank capitalists and a frac-
tion (1 − ) of workers become entrepreneurs. Households invest in deposits and corporate
bonds10 with intermediaries that they do not own. Due to the possibility of bank runs, the
return on deposits is actually subject to a time-varying risk (details in Appendix 1)11. Bank
capitalists and entrepreneurs accumulate wealth in every period using the proceeds from
their investment activity: we assume that such proceeds are reinvested entirely. Workers
in the production sector receive an hourly nominal wage  while workers in the financial
industry (bank managers) receive for their services a time-varying fee, Ξ.
Households maximize the following discounted sum of utilities:
0
∞X
=0
( ) (1)
where  denotes aggregate consumption and  denotes labour hours. Households
receive, on deposits, a gross nominal return  one period later. Households are the owners
of the monopolistic competitive sector, hence they receive Θ in nominal profits in each
period. The budget constraint reads as follows:
 +  ++1 ≤ +Θ + Ξ + (2)
where  is lump sum taxation. Households choose the set of processes { }∞=0 and
assets {+1}∞=0 taking as given the set of processes { }∞=0 and the initial wealth
0 so as to maximize 1 subject to 2. The following optimality conditions hold:
10Corporate bonds are assumed to be risk free and to have a return equal to the risk free rate on deposits,
for simplicity. Based on the Harrison and Kreps [31] equivalence result we can omit corporate bonds from the
budget constraint as their return can be expressed as a linear transformation of returns on demand deposits.
11If a run occurs the depositors are paid by the bank up to the realized banks’ returns; the rest is covered
by the government via lump sum taxations. Hence the default aﬀects the resource constraint but not the
households’ budget constraint. To preserve the possibility of bank runs, it is suﬃcient to assume that the
government covers the remaining losses only after the bank has defaulted and paid its fraction of realized
returns.
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
 = −

 (3)
 = {+1} (4)
Equation 3 gives the optimal choice for labour supply. Equation 4 gives the Euler con-
dition with respect to demand deposits. Optimality requires that the first order conditions
and No-Ponzi game conditions are simultaneously satisfied.
4.2 Intermediation sector
The intermediation sector collects funds from outside investors (demand depositors, holding
short term liabilities subject to a service constraint, and bank capitalists) and allocates them
to entrepreneurs, who undertake capital investment. Firms finance investment with bank
lending, corporate bonds and internal funds. The returns to capital investment has a general
aggregate component, represented by the marginal productivity of capital plus the capital
gains obtained through the resale market. The intermediary (bank) is subject to two idio-
syncratic shocks. The first, on the return of the project, is visible only to entrepreneurs: this
creates an agency problem between the intermediary and the entrepreneurs, which is solved
through a debt contractual agreement. The second, aﬀecting the return on bank lending, is
observable by the bank but not by its outside investors: this informational advantage cre-
ates an agency problem between the intermediary and the bank’s external financiers. This
second agency problem is solved through a contractual agreement between the bank and its
outside investors. The presence of two shocks permits to distinguish between two diﬀerent
risks inherent in the intermediary’s activity: one concerning the project being financed, the
other regarding the balance sheet structure of the bank itself, specifically the composition
of its funding between capital and deposit liabilities (or equivalently, its leverage).
To allow a tractable representation of the two agency problem, we consider an intermedi-
ary organized in two departments, a funding one and a lending one. The lending department
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is modeled by designing a standard debt contract (a’ la Gale and Hellwig [29]) along the
lines of the financial accelerator, while the funding department is modeled assuming that a
"manager " determines the composition of bank liabilities so as to optimize the combined
return of depositors and bank capitalists (along the lines of Angeloni and Faia [9], who apply
the theory of Diamond and Rajan [24], [25]). In general equilibrium the two agency prob-
lems interact in characterizing the transmission of monetary policy in our model, as detailed
below.
4.2.1 Bank Lending
The credit side is modelled as a standard financial accelerator (Bernanke et al. [12], Faia and
Monacelli [28]). Entrepreneurs finance their capital, +1, partly through internal funds,
+1 and partly through external funds, +1.12 The latter includes a fixed proportion
1−  of bank funds, +1, while the rest is raised by issuing corporate bonds.
The investment projects are characterized by a return equal to +1+1, where +1,
 and+1 are respectively the nominal return on capital, the price of capital and the stock
of capital: their values are determined by the behavior of capital producers (see below).
Project outcomes are subject to an idiosyncratic uncertainty, taking the form of a multiplica-
tive random shock on expected returns. The shock  is assumed to have a uniform density
function () with support [ ]; hence  ∈ ( ); () = 1− ;() = +2 13. Therefore,
the monetary return of an investment project financed at  is given by +1+1+114.
Importantly, this shock is freely observed (ex-post) only by the entrepreneur: observability
by the bank is subject to the payment of a proportional monitoring cost,  This informa-
tional assumption gives rise to an agency problem between the bank and the entrepreneurs.
12Individual subscripts are omitted for brevity, also since ex-post the linearity characterizing the finance
premia and the loan schedule allow us to aggregate according to representative firms and banks.
13Contractual optimality requires a shock distribution with a decreasing hazard rate. Such an assumption
is compatible with several probabilistic structure (uniform, logistic, lognormal). We have chosen the uniform
as this allows to obtain closed form solutions for the external finance premium.
14+1 therefore represents the expected average return with respect to the idiosyncratic shock .
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The debt contract requires maximizing the expected returns to the entrepreneurs15 subject
to participation constraints for both, entrepreneurs and the intermediary.
The mechanism which guarantees incentive compatibility, namely that the firm does not
mis-report the true return, is as follows. For all realization of +1 for which the project
return is high enough to guarantee loan repayment, the contract stipulates a non-contingent
(with respect to the realization of +1) repayment schedule, +1 whose value is set equal
to the minimum return for which repayment is possible. This guarantees that entrepreneurs
do not have incentives to mis-report. Under the solvency states the entrepreneur retains the
surplus, given by the diﬀerence between the actual realized return and the non contingent
repayment schedule. In the no-solvency region, the bank acquires information on the true
realized return by paying a monitoring cost and repossesses everything that is left (maximum
recovery property).
In the dynamic contract, the threshold value, +1, above which the entrepreneur is
able to repay, is determined by the following condition:
+1 ≡ 
+1+1
+1+1+1 (5)
which establishes the minimum value, +1 for which the unitary monetary return from
holding a unit of capital, +1+1, falls short of the repayment schedule, +1+1 Being
a zero profit condition, equation 5 also represents entrepreneurs’ participation constraint:
project expected returns should guarantee the existence of region with profits larger or equal
to zero.
Given the above contractual agreement, for each nominal unit lent, the gross expected
return to the lender is given by:
Γ(+1) ≡
µZ +1

+1(+1) +
Z 
+1
+1(+1)
¶
(6)
15As agents, entrepreneurs have the bargaining power.
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and the expected return to the firm is the complement, 1−Γ(+1). The cost of monitoring
is
(+1) ≡ 
Z +1

+1(+1) (7)
hence the net expected unit return accruing to the lender is Γ(+1)− (+1).
The entrepreneur’s investment is financed by a mix of internal and external funds. On
the external side, a fraction  is financed by funds intermediated by the bank, and the
remaining part is financed through corporate debt sold to households. The expected returns
on the two components of external finance are  and , respectively. The first of these two
returns is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, discussed in the next sub-section. The second
is assumed to be equal to the contractual (risk free) rate on bank deposits, 
The participation constraint for the lender establishes that its expected returns must
not be inferior to the cost of funds:
£
(1− ) + 
¤
(+1 −+1) ≤ +1+1[Γ(+1)− (+1)] (8)
The lending contract establishes an optimal value for the amount of lending, +1
and the threshold, +1, which maximize the expected return to the entrepreneur subject to
entrepreneurs’ participation constraint, 5, and lenders’ participation constraint, 8. Working
out the analysis, one obtains an expression for the premium on external finance, (+1), as
follows
(+1) = 
+1
[(1− ) + ] = (+1)
µ
1− +1+1
¶
(9)
where +1 and  are respectively the optimal threshold and the cost of bank monitoring in
the financial accelerator model. One can easily show that 0(•)  0. This expression suggests
that the external finance premium is an equilibrium inverse function of the aggregate financial
conditions in the economy, expressed by the (inverse) leverage ratio +1+1 .
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Lastly, we need to determine the evolution of the aggregate net worth. Entrepreneurs
are finitely lived16, with a probability of remaining in business next period equal to, . Next
period net worth is given by the accumulated expected returns accruing to entrepreneurs
who do not exit the market:
+1 = (1− Γ(+1)) (10)
Rearranging and using 8 one can write this as:
+1 =  −1 − 
©£
(1− ) + 
¤
+ª (−1 −) (11)
where  = () −1−1− is the expected monitoring cost per unit of loan.
4.2.2 Bank Funding
The funding department raises funds from outside investors, depositors and banks capitalists,
and allocates them to the lending department. Total funds, given by the sum of deposits
() and bank capital, (), equal bank lending, which in turn equals the external finance
by firms after subtracting the part financed on the bond market (share )17:
 = (1− )(−1 −) =  + (12)
The liability structure of the bank, measured by the deposit share,  =  18, is determined
by a bank liability manager on behalf of the external financiers (depositors and bank capital-
ists). What we call, for terminological simplicity, deposits are not traditional retail deposits,
which usually are nearly fully insured; they are uninsured short term funding instruments
(for example, asset-backed securities, or repos). These instruments yield a contractual non-
contingent return set ex-ante, and are subject to "run", in the form of roll-over risk. The
16This assumption is needed in order to avoid that they accumulate enough wealth, thereby making the
intermediary unnecessary.
17Individual subscripts are omitted for simplicity: the linearity of the problem allows easy aggregation.
18In our simple bank balance sheet the deposit share is the complement to unity of the capital share,
 = 1−  . Hence we have a monotonic positive relation between  and the bank’s leverage, 
17
manager’s task is to find the capital structure that maximizes the combined expected (with
respect to the idiosyncratic shock observed ex-post by the bank manager) return of deposi-
tors and capitalists, in exchange for a fee. Individual depositors are served sequentially and
fully as they come to the bank for withdrawal; bank capitalists are rewarded pro-quota after
all depositors are served. This payoﬀ mechanism exposes the bank to runs, that occur when
the uncertain return from the project is insuﬃcient to reimburse all depositors. As soon as
depositors realize that the payoﬀ is insuﬃcient, they run the bank and force the liquidation
of the project; in this case the bank capital holders get zero while depositors get the market
value of the liquidated loan. 19
The lending and the funding departments are tied by a contract that stipulates that the
former pays to the latter a return on the funds received  . Such return can be obtained
inverting the expression of external finance premium 9, yielding an equation where 
depends positively on +1+1 , for given . Moreover, we assume that the return on assets,
  for the funding department is subject to an idiosyncratic shock  with a uniform
distribution defined in the space {−;} 20. We can think of  as a liquidity shock, due for
example to a dry up in the interbank market. We assume the bank is a relationship lender:
by financing the project, it acquires a specialized non-sellable knowledge of its characteristics
that determines an advantage in extracting value from it before the project is concluded,
relative to other agents. For this reason the bank is able to repossess the entire return
 + , whereas if outside investors try to liquidate the project without the assistance of
the bank manager, they are able to obtain only a fraction  of the return. This gives the
bank a bargaining power, that allows to extract a rent, proportional to the remaining part
(1− ). Notice that, since bank capitalists bear the risk of run, the bank manager rewards
19The contractual agreement between banks and depositors is incentive compatible, implying that the
bank is willing to declare the true realized return on assets: the threat of bank runs, indeed, works as
truth revealing mechanism, providing a discipline device. As pointed out in Diamond and Rajan [25] in this
context deposit insurance is ineﬃcient as it distorts banks’ incentives.
20In Angeloni and Faia [9] we show that results are unchanged also when assuming a logistic or a normal
distribution. The uniform distribution is chosen as benchmark as it allows for analytical solution of the
deposit ratio, therefore allows us to gain intuition of the main mechanisms at work.
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them in the no run states by assigning them part of the rents, (1− )
The timing is as follows. At time , the bank manager decides the optimal capital
structure, expressed by the ratio of deposits to the total cost of the project, , collects
the funds, and transfers the funds to the lending department. At time  + 1, the project’s
outcome is revealed, the contractual return  is transferred from the lending to the funding
department, as discussed below, and payments to depositors and capitalists are made. A
new round of projects starts.
Even if the full value is extracted from the project, without loss of relationship knowl-
edge, a bank run entails a specific cost 1   ≥ 0; when a run occurs, the value of the project
loses a constant fraction , that can be interpreted as arising from early liquidation.
Consider the payoﬀs to each of our players, namely the depositor, the bank capitalist
and the bank manager. Three possible cases arise.
Case A: Run for sure. The return is too low to pay depositors;  +  . Payoﬀs
in case of run are distributed as follows. Capitalists receive the leftover after depositors are
served, so they get zero in this case. Depositors, in absence of bank intervention, would get
only a fraction (1−)( +) of the project’s outcome. The remainder (1−)(1−)( +)
is split in half between depositors and the bank manager21. Therefore, depositors get
(1 + )(1− )( + )
2
(13)
and the bank manager gets:
(1− )(1− )( + )
2
(14)
Case B: Run only without the bank. The return is high enough to allow depositors to
be served if the project’s value is extracted by the bank manager, but not otherwise; i.e
( + )   ≤ ( + ). In equilibrium the run does not occur, so depositors are
21In Angeloni and Faia [9] we show that diﬀerent bargaining share between outside investors and bank
managers would not aﬀect the results. The equal split is chosen for analytical simplicity.
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paid in full, , and the remainder is split in half between the bank manager and the
capitalists, each getting 
 +−
2
. Total payment to outsiders is 
 ++
2
.
Case C: No run for sure. The return is high enough to allow all depositors to be served,
with or without the bank’s participation. This happens if  ≤ ( + ). Depositors
get . However, unlike in the previous case, now the capitalists have a higher bargaining
power because they could decide to liquidate the project alone and pay the depositors in full,
getting ( + ) − . This value is thus a lower bound for them. The bank manager
can extract ( +)−: once again the surplus arising by the bank intervention is split
in half with the bank capitalists. Hence the bank manager gets:©£
( + )−
¤− £( + )−¤ª
2
=
(1− )( + )
2
(15)
an amount lower than the one the capitalist gets. Total payment to outsiders is:
(1 + )( + )
2
The manager chooses  to maximize the expected payoﬀ to outside investors; summing
up the total expected payments to them in the three cases delivers the following expression:
1
2
−Z
−
(1 + )(1− )( + )
2
 + 1
2
 −Z
−
( + ) +
2
 + (16)
+
1
2
Z
 −
(1 + )( + )
2

It can be shown (see [9] for details) that the value of  that maximizes equation 16 is
comprised in the interval  +    
 + . In this zone, the third integral in the equation
vanishes and the expression reduces to
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12
−Z
−
(1 + )(1− )( + )
2
 + 1
2
Z
−
( + ) +
2
 (17)
The above function is a piece-wise concave function, hence the second order condition
is satisfied. Diﬀerentiating and solving for  yields the following equilibrium condition:
 = 
 + 
 (18)
Where  = 1
2−+(1+) . In the following we will refer to
 + as the "bank lending
premium". Note that the equilibrium deposit ratio, , is inversely proportional to ; this
is straightforward because  and  appear only in multiplicative form in the outsiders’
payoﬀ function 17. Moreover, , is directly proportional to  + , the upper limit of the
distribution of payoﬀs. The intuition can be grasped by inspecting equation 17. At the
margin, an increase in the deposit ratio aﬀects the payoﬀ function through two channels.
First, by increasing the range of realizations of  where a run occurs (raising the upper
limit of the first integral) and decreasing the range where a run does not occur (raising the
lower limit of the second integral). This eﬀect does not depend on either  or . The
second channel is an increase of the payoﬀ to outsiders for each  in the interval where a
run does not occur, i.e. the interval of the second integral of 17. This eﬀect is proportional
to  +  − , the size of this interval. From this we can see that the optimal  must
be homogeneous of degree one in  + . 22 Note also that the parameter  is positively
related to  and negatively related to . Intuitively, an increase of  (a higher cost of run)
22More formally, a marginal increase in the deposit ratio increases the range of  where a run oc-
curs, by raising the upper limit of the first integral; this eﬀect increases the overall payoﬀ to outsiders
by 12
³
(1+)(1−)
2 
´
. A marginal increase in the deposit ratio also decreases the range of  where
a run does not occur, by raising the lower limit of the second integral; the eﬀect of this on the payoﬀ is
negative and equal to − 122. Moreover, it also increases the return to outsiders for each value of  where
a run does not occurs; this eﬀect is 12
⎛
⎜⎝
Z
−
1
2
⎞
⎟⎠ = 12
³ +−
2
´
. Equating to zero the sum
of these eﬀects and solving for  yields equation 18.
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decreases the optimal deposit ratio, as does a decrease of  (a stronger relationship lender
eﬀect), for any given value of the bank lending premium  + .
From 18 we derive an expression for total bank capital as:
 = (1−  +  ) (19)
Note that 19 suggests that the bank lending premium is positively related to bank lever-
age  ; as leverage increases, the market demands a higher premium to continue supplying
funds. We will return on this point later. Finally, a natural measure the intermediary’s risk
in our model is given by the probability of bank runs, defined as:
 = 12
−Z
−
 = 1
2
µ
1− 
 −

¶
(20)
Bank capital accumulation After remunerating depositors and paying the fee to the
manager, a return accrues to the bank capitalist as retained earning. Bank capital accumu-
lates from retained earnings as follows:
 =  [−1 +
 (1− )(−1 −)] (21)
where  is the unitary return to the capitalist and  = −1 is inflation, which will
be defined and derived in section 4.3 and which enters here since the accumulation involves
bank capital at diﬀerent dates. The parameter  is the bank survival rate, which by law of
large number equalizes the ratio of bank capitalists present in the economy in each periods.
 can be derived from equation 17 as follows:
 = 12
Z
−
( + )−
2
 = (
 + −)2
8 (22)
Note that this expression considers only the no-run state because if a run occurs the capitalist
22
receives no return. The accumulation of bank capital is obtained substituting 22 into 21:
 =  [−1 +
( + −)2
8 (1− )(−1 −)] (23)
The bank capital structure depends on several counterbalancing factors. To gain intu-
ition one can interpret equation 19 as a "demand" for bank capital given the volume of loans
 and the interest rate structure (,  ), while equation 23 can be seen as a "supply" of
bank capital in the following period.
4.3 Producers
Given that our focus is on the analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism, we allow for
non neutral eﬀects of monetary policy; to that aim we introduce sticky prices, by assuming
quadratic adjustment costs on prices. Each firm  has monopolistic power in the production
of its own variety and therefore has leverage in setting the price. In changing prices it faces a
quadratic cost equal to 
2
( ()−1()−1)2 where the parameter measures the degree of nominal
price rigidity. The higher  the more sluggish is the adjustment of nominal prices. Each firm
assembles labour (supplied by the workers) and (finished) entrepreneurial capital to operate
a constant return to scale production function for the variety  of the intermediate good:
() =  (()())Each monopolistic firm chooses a sequence {() () ()}
taking nominal wage rates and the rental rate of capital  as given, in order to maximize
expected discounted nominal profits:
0{
∞X
=0
Λ0[()()− (() + ())− 
2
∙ ()
−1() − 
¸2
]} (24)
subject to the following aggregate demand constraint (•) ≤ () = (() )−,
where Λ0 = +1 is the households’ stochastic discount factor.
Let’s denote by {}∞=0 the sequence of Lagrange multipliers on the above demand
constraint and by ˜ ≡ () the relative price of variety  After dividing the profit function
by the aggregate price  and taking first order conditions, we obtain:
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
 =  (25)

 =  (26)
0 = ˜− ((1− ) + )− 
∙
 ˜˜−1 − 1
¸ 
˜−1 + (27)
+{
∙
+1 ˜+1˜ − 1
¸
+1 ˜+1˜2 }
where  is the marginal product of labour,  the marginal product of capital and
 = −1 is the gross aggregate inflation rate. Notice that all firms employ an identical
capital/labour ratio in equilibrium, so individual prices are all equal in equilibrium. The
Lagrange multiplier plays the role of the real marginal cost of production. In a symmetric
equilibrium ˜ = 1 After substituting the stochastic discount factor, and the condition for a
symmetric equilibrium, equation 27 takes the following form:
( − 1) = {+1(+1 − 1)+1}+ (28)
+(•) ( −
− 1
 )
The above equation is a non-linear forward looking New-Keynesian Phillips curve, in which
deviations of the real marginal cost from its desired steady state value are the driving force
of inflation.
4.3.1 Capital producers
Adjustment costs on capital are introduced to obtain a time-varying price of capital. A
competitive sector of capital producers combines investment, expressed in the same compos-
ite index as the final good, hence with price  and existing capital stock to produce new
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capital goods. This activity entails physical adjustment costs. The corresponding constant-
returns-to-scale production function is (  ) so that capital accumulation obeys:
+1 = (1− ) + (  ) (29)
where (•) is increasing and convex. Define  as the re-sell price of the capital good.
Capital producers maximize profits (  ) −  implying the following optimal price
of assets: 0(  ) = The gross (nominal) return from holding one unit of capital between
 and +1 is composed of the rental rate plus the re-sell price of capital (net of depreciation
and physical adjustment costs):
  ≡  +((1− )− 0(  )

 + (

 )) (30)
The gross (real) return to entrepreneurs from holding a unit of capital between  and
+1 is equalized in equilibrium to the gross (real) return that entrepreneurs return to banks
for their loan services, +1:
+1
+1 ≡
 +1
 =
+1+1+1 ++1((1− )− 0( +1+1 ) +1+1 + ( +1+1 ))
 (31)
Equation 31 establishes that the aggregate return to capital must equate the marginal
productivity of capital, +1+1+1 plus the capital gains, +1  obtained by reselling
capital at the end of period  The capital sold at the end of period  is net of depreciation
and of the adjustment costs to investment.
4.4 Oﬃcial sector and market clearing
We assume that monetary policy is conducted by means of an interest rate reaction function
of this form:
ln
µ
1 +
1 +
¶
= (1− )
∙
 ln
³

´
+  ln
µ

¶¸
+  ln
µ
1 +−1
1 +
¶
(32)
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All variables at the denominator, without time subscript, are the target or steady state.
The government runs a balance budget and uses lump sum taxation to finance exogenous
government expenditure and to cover the average losses to households in case bank runs
occur, hence  =  + ∆ where ∆ is the aggregate expected loss from deposits (see
Appendix 1).
Equilibrium in the final goods market requires that the production of the final good
equals the sum of private consumption by households and entrepreneurs, investment, public
spending, and the resource costs that originate from the adjustment of prices. The combined
resource constraints, inclusive of government budget, reads as follows:
 −Ω −Υ −∆ =  +  + + 
2
( − 1)2 (33)
In the above equation,  is government consumption of the final good which evolves exoge-
nously and is assumed to be financed by lump sum taxes. Notice that our model features
two other sources of output costs connected to bank probability of a run. First, the term
Ω = 12
−Z
−
(1− ) (+1 −+1) represents the expected cost of run, while
the term Υ =  −1
R +1
 +1(+1) is the monitoring costs paid by the banks
in case entrepreneurs fail to repay the loan. Both of them rise when the volatility of the
corresponding idiosyncratic components increases.
4.5 Parameter values
Household preferences and production. The time unit is the quarter. The utility function of
households is ( ) = 1− −11− +  log(1−) with  = 1 as in most real business cycle
literature. We set  set equal to 3, chosen in such a way to generate a steady-state level of
employment  ≈ 03. We set the discount factor  = 099, so that the annual real interest
rate is equal to 4%. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function  (•) =  ()1−
with  = 03 The quarterly aggregate capital depreciation rate  is 0.025, the elasticity of
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substitution between varieties 6. The adjustment cost on capital takes the following form:
((
2
)(  − )2) and the parameter  is set so that the volatility of investment is larger
than the volatility of output, consistently with empirical evidence: this implies an elasticity
of asset prices to investment of 2.
In order to parameterize the degree of price stickiness  we rely on the comparison
between the slope of the log-linear Phillips curve in our model, −1  with that arising under
a Calvo-Yun set up, which is given by (1−ˆ)(1−ˆ)ˆ  where ˆ is the probability of not resetting
the price in any given period. Given the values for the demand elasticity  = 6, a value
of ˆ = 075, which is compatible with most empirical evidence, the comparison delivers a
value for the price stickiness parameter in our model of  =  ˆ(−1)
(1−ˆ)(1−ˆ) ≈ 30 where  is
steady-state output.
Banks. In the lending department, the parameters for the debt contract, the monitoring
cost  and the volatility of corporate risk, 2 are calibrated following the financial accelerator
literature and so as to generate a steady state solution for the external finance premium of
400 basis points. This delivers a value of the monitoring costs of 3% of asset value and a
volatility of corporate risk, 2 of 0.15.
In the funding department, to calibrate  we have calculated the average volatility of
bank stocks over the last 10 years (GARCH estimates and realized volatilities yield roughly
the same result) which is around 0.3, and multiplied this by the square root of 3, the ratio
of the maximum deviation to the standard deviation of a uniform distribution. The result,
0.5, is our benchmark.
One way to interpret  is to see it as the ratio of two present values of the project, the
first at the interest rate applied to firms’ external finance, the second discounted at the bank
internal finance rate (the money market rate). A benchmark estimate can be obtained by
taking the historical ratio between the money market rate and the lending rate. In the US
over the last 20 years, based on 30-year mortgage loans, this ratio has been around 3 percent.
This leads to a value of  around 0.6. In the numerical simulations we have chosen a value
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of 0.5. Finally we parametrize the survival rate of banks,  at 0.97, a value compatible with
an average horizon of 10 years. Notice that the parameter (1− ) is meant to capture only
the exogenous exit rates, not the failure rates. Entrepreneurs survival probability,  is set
according to most parametrization in the financial accelerator literature, namely at a value
of 0975
Finally, the fraction  of bank versus market finance is parametrized at a benchmark
value of 0.5. Sensitivity checks are done on the value of this parameter. A high value
would indeed be consistent with practice in Anglo-Saxon financial markets, in which equity
or corporate debt finance tends to prevail over bank finance, while a low value would be
consistent with the practice in European financial markets, in which banks’ finance tends to
prevail.
Shocks. We introduce into the model two standard macro shocks. The first, a produc-
tivity shock, is simulated in order to describe the transmission mechanism at work in our
model. The monetary policy shock is simulated to analyze the risk taking channel. Total
factor productivity is assumed to evolve as  = −1 exp( ).
where the steady-state value  is normalized to unity and where  is an i.i.d. shock
with standard deviation 
We introduce a monetary policy shock as an additive disturbance to the interest rate set
through the monetary policy rule. The monetary policy shock is assumed to be moderately
persistent (coeﬃcient 0.3), as argued by Rudebusch [42]. Based on the evidence presented
in section 3, and consistently with other empirical results for US and Europe, the standard
deviations of the shocks is set to 0006.
5 Model analysis and results
To gain intuition and make the analysis of this rather complex model more manageable, we
proceed in two steps: first, in the next subsection, we discuss the working of both sides of
the bank (liabilities and assets), intuitively explaining how their interaction influences the
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transmission of monetary policy. Then, in the next subsection we examine two impulse re-
sponses, respectively to a monetary policy shock and a productivity shock (with endogenous
response of monetary policy).
5.1 The unfolding of risk: interaction of balance sheet and risk
taking channels
The intermediation sector of our model can be laid down in four equations: two premia and
two asset accumulations. From now on for simplicity, and in order to isolate the banking
eﬀects, we will assume that  = 0 On the side of the funding department, the bank lending
premium (BLP) reads as follows:
 + 
 = 
−1(

−1 − ) = 
−1(

 +  ) (34)
The accumulation of bank capital reads as follows:
 = [−1 + (
 + −)2
8 (−1 −)] (35)
On side of the lending department, the external finance premium (EFP) is:
+1
 = (
+1
+1 ) = (+1) (36)
(with 0  0) The entrepreneurs’ net worth accumulation is given by:
+1 =  −1 −  { +} (−1 −) (37)
Let’s now analyze the functioning of the two departments in isolation and then combined.
We will focus on the resulting dynamic of bank riskiness and on of real variables (primarily
output and investment) in response to a monetary restriction occurring at time  − 1. We
will then consider the eﬀects of other shocks.
• Funding department. Consider first the functioning of the funding department in isola-
tion. This essentially means setting the EFP constant and equal to one. The interest
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rate increase triggers a fall in asset prices and investment. Two eﬀects operate in the
funding side. First, the fall in project values induces the bank to reduce the demand
for outside funding (+). This captures a banks’ balance sheet channel: as bank
lending values decrease, liabilities do so as well. Second, other things equal, an increase
in the policy rate makes short term funding,  more expensive compared to bank
capital, hence the bank reduces short term liabilities more than proportionally relative
to bank capital. This reduces bank leverage and risk, capturing the essence of the risk
taking channel. Consider now the eﬀect on the bank lending premium. The left-hand
side of equation 34 falls since, as just mentioned, the right-hand side falls; hence BLP
falls. The movements of output, relatively to a model without risk taking channel, are
mainly driven by the expected resource cost of run and the expected loss on deposits,
Ω and ∆: as risk falls these variables do as well, therefore dampening the initial fall
in output.
• Lending department. The eﬀects of the monetary policy shock follow the conventional
financial accelerator mechanism. The fall in the asset price brings about a fall in en-
trepreneurs’ balance sheet, which drives an increase in the EFP. The ensuing increase
in the cost of loan services triggers a further fall in investment, asset price and entre-
preneurs’ balance sheet. This mechanism results in an accelerated fall in investment
and output.
• Combined eﬀects. As outlined above, in presence of a risk taking channel, the fall
in asset prices produces a fall in  more than proportional to , hence the bank
capital structure becomes less risky. The increase in the interest rate leads to a decline
in net worth that induces a decline in the BLP via equation 34, hence the banks’ returns
on asset,  , rises more than in the AF model. The funding department reacts by
decreasing leverage and risk by more; hence in the combined model the fall in bank risk
is also amplified relatively to the model featuring solely the risk taking channel. Recall
that fluctuations in bank risk aﬀect the resource costs due to the risk of run and to the
30
risk premium on deposits, respectively Ω and ∆: in the combined model the larger
fall in bank risk produces a larger fall in the resource costs, therefore dampening the
initial output contraction, relatively to both the model with the risk taking channel
alone and that with the financial accelerator alone.
All in all in the combined model we should expect larger fluctuations in the dynamic of
bank riskiness and more muted fluctuation in output and its components (investment and
consumption).
Consider now an increase in productivity,  There are two contrasting eﬀects. On the
one hand, a productivity increase, by lowering inflation on impact, should increase bank risk
via the risk-taking channel. On the other hand, however, it also brings about an increase
in the return on capital +1, as seen from the equation describing the return to capital
investment 31. The increase in +1 leads to an increase in  , that is also reinforced
by the fall, in the medium run, of the EFP, as can be seen by rearranging equation 36 to
obtain  = 
+1
( +1+1 )
; as firms’ balance sheet conditions improve, the EFP falls, thereby
amplifying the increase in  . For the funding department, this implies less risk, as per
equation  +   , the more so the larger the increase in   As seen earlier, the
fluctuations in bank riskiness are reflected in the fluctuations of the resource costs, hence in
output.
To complete our assessment of how firms’ and banks’ balance sheet risks interconnect,
let’s now consider an exogenous increase in the riskiness of investment projects, 2 or, more
generally, in the probability that entrepreneurs fail to repay the loan (a mean preserving
shift in the density of the distribution to the tails). Such an increase triggers an increase in
the EFP, which, via equation 36, reduces  . This increases the probability of run. Once
again, the increase in intermediary’s risk produces an increase in resource costs and depresses
output. This is another illustration of the self-reinforcing nature of risk in our model: an
increase in risk on the asset side, due for instance to shift toward fat tails distributions, also
increases the likelihood of runs in the liability side.
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5.2 Model results
We now illustrate the mechanisms just described by showing impulse responses to two shocks:
a moderately persistent monetary contraction and a very persistent increase in productivity.
We compare the results of three models. The first (the one we labelled AF) includes only
the funding unit of the bank, as in AF, and hence features solely the risk taking channel
on the liability side. The second (labelled BGG) is the classical financial accelerator, which
includes only the lending unit of the bank23. The third is a "combined model" (labelled
AFBGG) that includes both sides of the bank and the full interactions described above.
Note that, in the charts, some variables are specific to the models with endogenous bank
liability structure, AF and the AFBGG (for example, the deposit ratio and bank riskiness),
while other variables are specific to the models with financial accelerator, BGG and AFBGG
(for example, the external finance premium).
Figure 2 shows the impulse response to a monetary restriction: in all models, output,
investment and asset prices decline. The decline in output is sharper in the BGG model
due to the financial accelerator channel. Both the AF and the AFBGG feature a risk
taking channel: the funding department reduces the deposit ratio and bank risk decreases.
As explained in the previous paragraph the fall in asset prices triggers a fall of required
bank funding: this induces a fall in  which, due to the risk taking channel, is more than
proportional to the fall in and triggers a fall in bank riskiness. Comparing the combined
model AFBGG with AF, one has to consider that the decline in net worth, following the
increase in the interest rate, induces a decline in the BLP via equation 34, hence the banks’
returns on asset,  , rises in AFBGG less than in AF. The funding department reacts to
this by decreasing leverage by more (panel 4:1 in the figure). In equilibrium this makes bank
risk also decline more (panel 4:2). The larger decline in bank risk in the combined model
23The BGG model is calibrated so as to generate steady state levels of the EFP and of the firms’ de-
fault probability which are equivalent to the ones featured in the AF_BGG. This implies that the cost of
monitoring and the 2 in the BGG model have to be set respectively to the 5% of the asset value and to
0.3.
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produces a decline (in relative terms) in the resource costs, which dampens the fall in output
relatively to both the AF and the BGG model24.
A further consideration: the fall in the banks’ returns on asset  in AFBGG explains
also, via equation 37, a higher level of net worth relative to BGG (in both models net worth
declines, but less so in AFBGG relative to BGG). This is suﬃcient to generate, in AGBGG,
a decline in the EFP, that contrasts with the increase observed in BGG.
Figure 3 shows impulse responses to a productivity increase. Again, BGG features the
strongest initial eﬀect on output. This matches the fact that the EFP and the probability
that entrepreneurs will not repay decline in BGG: healthier firms’ balance sheets trigger fur-
ther increases in investment and asset prices, which then lead to the well known accelerated
dynamics. In the AF model the deposit ratio and bank riskiness increase, due to the fall in
the interest rate: this triggers an increase in the resource costs associated with the bank run;
as a result the increase in output is dampened relatively to the BGG model. The combined
model features a diﬀerent dynamic in the short run relative to the medium to long run: this
is mainly due to the nature of the shock, which is now very persistent. In the short run
bank riskiness increases, as the risk taking channel prevails: as in the AF model this comes
along with a sharp fall in   as from equation 34, which brings about an increase of the
EFP on impact, as from equation 36. The short run increase in bank riskiness produces
an increase on impact of the resource costs: this depresses the increase in output relatively
to both the AF and the BGG model. Things are diﬀerent in the medium to long run: as
the nominal interest rate declines strongly (from the 2nd to the 5th quarter) firms’ balance
sheet improves, the EFP declines, moving below the baseline, and banks’ returns on assets
increase as from  = 
+1
( +1+1 )
 This reduces the probability of a run which declines sharply
24English et al. [27] have recently found an inverse eﬀect of short term rate surprises on bank stocks. In
our case, a positive interest rate shock has two eﬀects. On the one hand, it increases the payoﬀ accruing to
the capitalist; this can be seen by noting, inspecting equations 20 and 22, that the latter is positively related
to bank risk, which is known to decrease. On the other hand, however, a monetary restriction depresses the
firms’ net worth, hence reducing  other things equal. Casual obervation of the period prior to the crisis
suggests that a persistent monetary expansion was accompanied by high bank profitability, high output and
(as recognised ex-post) high bank riskiness.
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in the intermediate quarters. As usual, the movements in bank riskiness are mirrored in the
fluctuations of the resource costs and in output: as bank riskiness declines output recovers,
first relatively to the AF model and then also relatively to the BGG model.
Note that, while the link between EFP and the cycle in the financial accelerator model
is unambiguously negative, the relation between BLP and the cycle in both AF and AFBGG
depends on the origin of the disturbance.
6 Conclusions
As a consequence of the financial crisis, a broad reflection is underway on the working of
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in presence of financial risks. There is a
growing perception that existing macro models that do not incorporate financial sectors and
financial risks cannot provide a convincing representation of the eﬀects of monetary policy,
particularly when the banking and financial sectors are distressed.
Most macro-models inherited from earlier years incorporate financial factors through
a financial accelerator mechanism. We augment this standard model by adding a micro-
founded banking system, drawn, in its broad lines, from Angeloni and Faia [9]. The model
embodies an endogenous determination of bank risks, measured by the probability of the
bank incurring into a run on its deposits. In this model, monetary policy aﬀects bank risks,
and bank risks in turn contribute to shaping the transmission of monetary policy ("risk
taking channel" of monetary transmission).
The model we present here is clearly not an endpoint in a research line; we regard it
as an interesting benchmark for further progress in understanding the interlinkages between
the financial sector and the macroeconomy. Our summary conclusions at this stage are the
following. There is evidence that an expansionary monetary policy increases, with lags, the
propensity of banks to assume risk (a "risk taking channel" of monetary transmission). This
evidence upholds the case for incorporating this mechanism into macro-models. Our model
combines banks with an endogenous capital structure on the liability side (generating a risk
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of bank run) with a financial accelerator on the asset side (that embodies a risk of borrower
default). We find that the model combining the two sources of risk contains a number of
novel features concerning monetary transmission. Risks on the asset side and on the liability
side of banks tend to move together and reinforce each other. Importantly, the "risk taking
channel" tends to dampen the impact of monetary policy on output; that turns out to be
substantially weaker than in a pure financial accelerator model. This attenuation mechanism
operates when the two risks are combined; as a consequence, the transmission in our model
can be weaker also relative to a model in which only funding risks are modelled and there is
no financial accelerator.
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7 Appendix 1. Expected return on risky deposits
The expected return on deposits, taking into account the positive probability of bank run, is
below the riskless return . Consider the return on deposits per unit of funds intermediated
by the bank in the three possible events: run for sure, run only without bank, and no run
for sure. In the first case (run for sure), the payoﬀ to the depositor is (1+)(1−)( +)
2
. This
holds in the interval of  comprised between [−; ( − )]. The expected value of this
payoﬀ is 1
2
−Z
−
(1+)(1−)( +)
2
. This can be written, solving the integral and using
equation 20, as
(1 + )(1− )
2
−Z
−
( + )
2  =
(1 + )(1− )
2
∙
 + 12
( − )2 − 2
2
¸
=  (1 + )(1− )2
µ
 +  −
 − 
2
¶
=
1
4
(1 + )(1− )( + − )
In the range of  in which the run does not occur, the expected return is equal to the
riskless payoﬀ  multiplied by the probability of the respective event, (1− ).
The expected payoﬀ on deposits per unit of intermediated funds is given by:
1
4
(1 + )(1− )( + − ) + (1− )
The expected loss on deposits, relative to the no-default state, per unit intermediated
funds, is obtained subtracting the above expression from , the return in the no-default
state
 −
½
1
4
(1 + )(1− )( + − ) + (1− )
¾
=
40
= 
∙
 − 1
4
(1 + )(1− )( + − )
¸
The aggregate expected loss on deposits is equal to the above expression multiplied by
the total amount of finds intermediated by the bank, (1− )(+1 −)
∆ = (1− )(+1 −)
∙
 − 1
4
(1 + )(1− )( + − )
¸
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  FIGURE 1: VAR IMPULSE RESPONSE OF BANK RISK 
TO A CONTRACTIONARY MONETARY POLICY SHOCK
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FIGURE 2: MODEL IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A CONTRACTIONARY MONETARY POLICY SHOCK
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FIGURE 3: MODEL IMPULSE RESPONSES TO AN EXPANSIONARY PRODUCTIVITY SHOCK
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Variable name Description 
Industrial production 
index 
De-trended logarithm of the industrial production index 
(excluding construction). 
Source: Authors’ calculation and Datastream. 
Employment 
De-trended logarithm of total employment in non farm 
industries. 
Source: Authors’ calculation and Datastream. 
Commodity price 
inflation 
De-trended logarithm of a commodity price index 
(Commodity Research Bureau Spot Index) 
Source: Authors’ calculation and Datastream. 
Consumer price inflation 
De-trended logarithm of Consumer Price Index 
(All items All urban areas). 
Source: Authors’ calculation and Datastream 
Monetary policy rate De-trended effective Federal Fund rate. Source: Authors’ calculation and FED. 
Uncertainty shock - Risk 
Realised volatility of the S&P500 index. This variable 
captures the uncertainty shock of Bloom (2009). 
Source: Authors’ calculation and Datastream. 
Bank Funding Risk 
Ratio market based funding to banks’ total assets. Market 
based funding is the difference between total liabilities 
(excluding equity capital) and customer deposits. 
Source: Authors’ calculation and FED (Difference 
between line 42 and line 31 of the table H8 for 
Commercial Banks in the US). 
Bank Asset Risk 
(only in the model at 
quarterly frequency) 
Percentage of banks tightening credit standards on 
commercial and industrial loans to large and medium 
enterprises. 
 Source: FED Survey of Terms of Business Lending. 
Bank overall risk 
 
Realised volatility of the Datastream banking index for 
the US 
 Source: Authors’ calculation and Datastream. 
 
Notes: The order of the variables in the table reflects the order of the variables in the VAR, i.e. the 
shock to the macro variable is exogenous, while the shock on bank risk, the last shock, is a combination 
of all the other shocks. The model is as close as possible to Bloom (2009). The Estimation period of the 
baseline model is January 1980 – September 2011. De-trending has been done with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter (λ = 14400). Realised volatilities over one month are computed as the average of the 
daily absolute returns of the S&P500 over the month 
DATA APPENDIX
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